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Lost Decades: Postindependence 
Performance in Latin America and Africa 

ROBERT H. BATES, JOHN H. COATSWORTH,
AND JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON
Africa and Latin America secured independence from European colonial rule a 
century and half apart: most of Latin America by the 1820s and most of Africa 
by 1960. Despite the distance in time and space, they share important similari-
ties. In each case independence was followed by political instability, violent 
conflict, and economic stagnation lasting for about a half-century. The parallels 
suggest that Africa might be exiting from a period of postimperial collapse and 
entering one of relative political stability and economic growth, as did Latin 
America almost two centuries ago. 
frica and Latin America secured their independence from Euro-
pean colonial rule a century and half apart: most of Latin America 
by the 1820s and most of Africa by 1960.
1 Despite the distance in time 
and space, independence was followed in each case by a half-century of 
political instability, violent conflict and economic stagnation—lost dec-
ades. The parallels between postcolonial Latin America and Africa in-
vite comparison. We argue here that the failure to achieve stability and 
growth resulted from similarities in the conditions that produced those 
unfavorable outcomes. We also argue that the postimperial experiences 
of Latin American history suggest that Africa might now be entering a 
period of relative political stability and economic growth. In exploring 
the comparison, we proceed sequentially, first addressing the epoch of 
imperial rule and collapse, and then the postcolonial lost decades. Fol-
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1 Cuba and Puerto Rico are exceptions. 
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lowing the comparison, we discuss the subsequent revival in Latin 
America, its lessons for modern Africa, and offer reasons for believing 
that the latter may be recovering from its postcolonial decline and enter-
ing an era of political stability and economic growth. 
IMPERIAL RULE 
Economic Integration, Imperial Deterrent, and Stability 
  Imperial rule brought entire regions around the globe into direct con-
tact with the tensions and rivalries between European states. Most colo-
nies, however, did not become directly involved in these conflicts. In 
Latin America, the Dutch invaded Brazil’s sugar-rich northeast (1630–
1654); Spain lost most of its Caribbean possessions in the seventeenth 
century and fought to defend the rest for most of the eighteenth century; 
Spain and Portuguese Brazil skirmished over territory that is now Uru-
guay. But for the most part, the mainland colonies did not become the 
locus of disputes among European powers. The imperial occupation of 
Africa also occurred with a relatively low level of conflict, despite the 
belligerent nationalism that characterized the “great scramble” for Af-
rica.
2 Tensions were highest in North Africa, climaxing (perhaps) at the 
time of the Fashoda incident, but only during World War I did imperial 
nations fight on the continent.
3 They tended to resolve their disputes 
through diplomacy rather than warfare. 
  Imperialism also brought a measure of economic integration. It fos-
tered trade, if only because groups of colonies shared a single master. 
Trade and factor mobility were augmented within each of the imperial 
domains of Latin America due to common legal systems, fiscal policies, 
currencies, and governing structures. Spanish restrictions on intercolo-
nial trade in some products were imposed in the early seventeenth cen-
tury, but ended with the Bourbon Reforms in the eighteenth. French-
speaking territories in Africa formed a currency zone and sterling pro-
vided a common currency for Britain’s African colonies. Central Africa 
maintained a free trade zone; Southern Africa maintained a common 
tariff; and Britain promoted economic integration for Uganda, Kenya, 
and Tanganyika in east Africa and Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhode-
sia, and Nyasaland in Central Africa. 
2 Hopkins, Economic History; Pakenham, Scramble; and Abernethy, Dynamics.
3 The Fashoda Incident in Egyptian Sudan on 8 September 1898 was caused by territorial dis-
putes between France and Great Britain. Both countries wanted to link together their colonies 
with a system of railroads. This led to the confrontation at Fashoda, where the French east-west 
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  The imperial powers also successfully contained or repressed internal 
challenges to colonial rule. In Latin America, potential threats to colo-
nial rule came from ambitious European settlers, enslaved Africans and 
their descendants, and burdened indigenous peasants. Colonial govern-
ments produced few public goods, spent nothing on education and next 
to nothing on infrastructure apart from fortresses and customs houses. 
Many functions of the modern state were left to “corporate” bodies au-
thorized by the colonial authorities but formed by the settlers them-
selves: the Church, the militia, the merchant guilds (consulados), and 
other private organizations. These settlers demanded more power, more 
privileges, and lower taxes, and colonial courts and bureaucracies often 
served them better than the Crown. Spain and Portugal had virtually no 
police or professional military in their American colonies, but managed 
to deter (and occasionally suppress) settler-led revolts by maintaining 
their capacity to mobilize their vast imperial resources. This deterrent 
helped keep the settler elite in line, but the elite also needed imperial 
protection from the slaves and indigenous peasants that surrounded 
them. Large-scale revolts by Indian and slave populations were rare in 
Latin America, although low-intensity resistance was endemic.
4
  Imperialism was also accompanied by an influx of European settlers 
into eastern and southern Africa in the early twentieth century and from 
Portugal into south central Africa in the 1950s. As was true of Latin 
America, settlers in Africa adopted repressive labor strategies, force-
fully seized land, and drove the indigenous population into crowded re-
serves. By contrast, the Crown had largely abandoned forced indige-
nous labor in Latin America by the early 1600s (except in Peruvian 
mines) and made an effort to protect indigenous property rights. In both 
Africa and Latin America, natives were forced into formal labor mar-
kets to earn cash with which to pay taxes.
5
Demographic Disaster and Indigenous Accommodation 
  Perhaps the biggest difference between Latin American and African 
imperialism was its impact on demography. A century after Columbus’s 
first voyage, European disease had caused immense demographic dam-
age in Latin America as the indigenous population shrank from perhaps 
50 million in 1492 to as few as three to four million by the early seven-
teenth century.
6 The Atlantic slave trade tried to substitute African 
slaves for decimated indigenous populations but their addition was far 
4 Coatsworth, “Political Economy.” 
5 Palmer and Parsons, Roots.
6 Livi-Bacci, “Depopulation.” 920 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
smaller than the subtraction from the indigenous population caused by 
European disease. Moreover, Africans were not transported to the once 
densely populated highlands where the population losses were greatest, 
but mainly to the sugar-rich tropics. The demographic collapse de-
stroyed indigenous political and institutional structures, facilitated reli-
gious and cultural assimilation, and helped raise the per capita income 
of the indigenous survivors who resettled on the best lands.
7 By the 
mid-late seventeenth century, half of the much-diminished indigenous 
population had succumbed to European domination. The other half 
lived on the colonial fringe (e.g., the Mexican north, the southern cone, 
and the vast Amazonian interior). 
  Although there is evidence of African epidemics occurring in the 
wake of imperial incursion in Africa, the death rate among the local 
populations never approached anything like that which accompanied the 
massive collapse of indigenous Latin American populations.
8 The 
forced emigration of more than nine million slaves to the Americas cer-
tainly had a positive impact on labor supplies, but it was relatively small 
and spread out over four centuries. The demographic differences associ-
ated with early imperialism had important implications for the two re-
gions. First, the ratio of European settlers to indigenous populations was 
much bigger in colonial Latin America than it was in colonial Africa. In 
colonial Latin America, the figure was about 19 percent in 1605 and 40 
percent in 1810.
9 For British colonies in interwar Africa, the figure was 
about 0.1 percent, and for Portuguese colonies it was 1.9 percent.
10
Thus, the European presence in Latin America was from ten to four 
hundred times greater than in Africa. Second, because local African 
populations, and thus their institutions and political structures, remained 
pretty much intact, it often required the use of European military force 
to subjugate them.
11 In colonial Latin America, indigenous institutions 
virtually collapsed after the initial conquest, or persisted in vastly weak-
ened or altered forms. Third, the demographic disaster in Latin America 
7 Note the demographic parallel with Alwyn Young’s argument that today’s HIV-AIDS raises 
the incomes of those Africans who survive the disease (Young, “Gift”), or that the Irish famine 
raised per capita income of the survivors (Mokyr, Why Ireland).  
8 Kjekshus, Ecology Control.
9 These figures are from John Coatsworth’s ongoing research. They refer to Mexico, which 
had about the average Latin American European presence. The 40 percent figure for 1810 is 
composed of 18 percent white and 22 percent mixed race. 
10 These figures are from Robert Bates’s ongoing research. The British colonies include the 
Cameroons, Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togoland in 1931 and Kenya, 
N.  Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, and Uganda in 1931–1944. The Portuguese colonies 
include Angola, Cape Verde, Guine, Mocambique, and S. Tome e Principe.  
11 In other instances, as in Uganda and Northern Nigeria, occupation was achieved by align-
ing with local kingdoms or by pitting local groups against each other, i.e., by adopting policies 
of divide and conquer (or at least rule). Lost Decades 921 
must have contributed to higher (but unknown) GDP per capita there 
compared to Africa. In summary, different demographic experience 
must have left quite different economic and political imprints on the 
two colonial empires. Although this article stresses the similarities be-
tween postcolonial Africa and Latin America, some of the differences 
we observe may well be explained by the initial demographic events. 
IMPERIAL COLLAPSE 
  It is important to stress that the decline of imperialism in both Latin 
America and Africa was not driven by some endogenous response to lo-
cal forces but rather by exogenous events in Europe. In the former case, 
it was the Napoleonic wars that eroded Iberian imperial power, whereas 
in the latter it was World War II. 
  The collapse of the imperial deterrent occurred gradually for Portu-
guese Brazil and abruptly for the Spanish Americas. In Brazil, the Por-
tuguese government fleeing Napoleon’s army arrived in ships protected 
by the British fleet in 1807. Independence occurred when the king re-
luctantly returned to Lisbon in 1821, leaving his son behind to declare 
Brazil an independent “empire.” In the Spanish case, the imperial deter-
rent collapsed abruptly when Napoleon suddenly turned on the Spanish 
government. In 1808 he hustled the king (Carlos IV) and his eldest son 
(Fernando VII) off to a golden exile in Provence and installed his 
brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. By the time Fernando recovered 
his throne in 1813, both Spain and its empire had changed forever. For a 
brief time, it seemed possible to restore the status quo ante: the hidalgo 
revolt in Mexico was crushed in 1810; dissident movements in the An-
des were suppressed shortly thereafter; and the Venezuelan rebels led 
by Bolivar were defeated in 1812. But disaster struck with an army re-
volt against the Crown in 1820. When the king faltered, settler elites in 
the empire understood they could no longer rely on Spain to protect 
them. Indeed, the resumption of Spanish liberal reforms threatened their 
privileges, just at a time when the scramble for political power already 
threatened to get out of control. Hidalgo had already proclaimed the end 
of the caste system and legal equality of all Spanish subjects. Bolivar 
and San Martin offered freedom to slaves who joined them.
12 Indige-
nous populations had stopped paying the hated head tax (tributo). Urban 
workers with no property demanded voting rights. The settler elites 
might look back wistfully to a quieter time of stability and order, but, 
12 A number of Latin American republics legislated compensation for slave emancipation af-
ter independence, but few owners were compensated because the funds to do so evaporated dur-
ing the decades of civil wars and international conflicts during those lost decades. 922 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
with a weakened Spain turning liberal, insurrection and independence 
were around the Latin American corner. 
  As in Spanish America, most African anticolonial movements suf-
fered initial defeat, but external shocks associated with World War II 
strengthened these movements while weakening imperial power. The 
imperialists traded war services for pledges of citizenship and equality. 
Financially exhausted by the costs of war, and embattled by anti-
imperial uprisings in other parts of the globe, they also reluctantly con-
ceded power to local politicians. In the French territories, African voters 
won the right to elect representatives to the Parliament in Paris. In Eng-
lish-speaking Africa, the British appointed local politicians to legisla-
tive institutions; later, they filled these posts through elections; and later 
still they modified the colonial governor’s Cabinet in the same manner. 
  The demise of imperial rule in Latin America and Africa differed in 
at least one major respect. Imperial political retreat in Africa was ac-
companied by economic investment, and this investment was targeted at 
the traded portion of the economy.
13 The European powers emerged 
from World War II with immense debt and capital shortage.
14 In re-
sponse to economic exigencies, they rendered imperial policy a branch 
of national economic policy. This meant promoting African protection-
ism for France: rather than importing cocoa or coffee from Latin Amer-
ica, France promoted their production in its African colonies, and rather 
than importing foreign textiles, France encouraged the creation of tex-
tile factories in Africa.
15 For England and Belgium, it meant enhancing 
the capacity of their African colonies to produce goods for export to the 
dollar market. The postwar demand for African commodities grew as 
did colonial trade surpluses, and these surpluses were transferred to the 
home country where they were used to retire war debt.
16
13 Latin America experienced a more ephemeral investment cycle in the early to mid 1820s, 
with two marked differences. First, the capital did not come from their former imperial coun-
tries, but rather from private banks and citizens in Britain and the Continent. Second, most of it 
went into bonds issued by the newly independent governments (though there were significant 
FDI mining ventures in several countries, notably Mexico). The boom collapsed as fiscal crises 
contributed to government default on their debts and market insecurity no longer made FDI 
profitable. We return to the determinants of these fiscal crises below. 
14 Only Portugal, which remained neutral in World War II, emerged relatively unscathed by 
the fighting. 
15 Boone, Merchant Capital.
16 In the postwar period, Portugal also invested in its African territories. In the 1960s it pro-
moted the settlement of hundreds of thousands of colonists in Angola and Mozambique. As had 
the French, Portugal sponsored the production of colonial goods (by Portuguese firms) for ex-
port to the homeland, among them, fish, sugar, tea, coffee, and textiles. Lost Decades 923 
TABLE1
VIOLENCE INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA, 1800–1879 
Decade
Deaths from War 
and Civil Conflict  
Total Population
(000)    Deaths per 1,000 
1800–1809 0      
1810–1819    474,360   14,820   32 
1820–1829    307,439   16,822   18.3 
1830–1839    8,565   19,047   0.4 
1840–1849    147,680   21,566   6.8 
1850–1859    220,688   24,492   9 
1860–1869    357,141   27,869   12.8 
1870–1879    18,500   31,303   0.6 
Notes: Deaths here are those caused by civil and international conflict in 12 LA countries: Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.Total population was taken at mid-decade. 
Sources: Singer and Small, Wages of War 1816–1965, chapter 4; Scheina, Latin America’s 
Wars, pp. 93–375; and Coatsworth, “Patterns of Rural Rebellion,” pp. 36–37. 
INDEPENDENCE AND POSTIMPERIALISM 
Postcolonial Violence 
  As the empires collapsed, so too did imperial defenses against exter-
nal intervention and the imperial deterrent to internal conflict. Latin 
America fell victim to numerous foreign interventions (Table 1). Spain 
made serious efforts to reconquer its colonies until well in to the 1830s. 
Britain, France, Spain, and other powers imposed blockades or landed 
troops to secure economic and military advantages, or to defend their 
foreign markets. Elite factions in many former colonies supported these 
interventions. Beginning in the 1820s the United States competed di-
rectly with the British in Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and 
occasionally elsewhere, the two powers backing opposing factions in 
local civil conflicts. Relative to the industrial core, Latin America was a 
violent place between 1820 and 1870 where violent deaths averaged 1.2 
per thousand, or nearly four times that of western Europe.
17
  Foreign incursions also increased in postindependence Africa. While 
avoiding a hot war on European soil, the Soviet Union and the United 
States were quite willing to spar on developing world soil. The cold war 
spilled over into the Congo on several occasions, with the USSR, China, 
and Cuba supporting rebel movements and the United States and its al-
lies backing incumbent regimes. In the Horn of Africa, where tensions 
between Ethiopia and Somalia bred instability and conflict, the United 
States and the USSR again backed opposing sides. So too in South Africa, 
17 See the sources for Table 1. 924 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
TABLE2
VIOLENCE INDICATORS FOR EIGHT AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1950–1973 
 Assassinations  14 
 General  strikes  6 
 Guerrilla  warfare  38 
Major government crises   23 
 Purges  37 
 Riots  102 
 Revolutions  25 
Antigovernment demonstrations 39 
Note: The eight countries are: Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Zaire. The totals refer to all 23 years, and “warfare” refers to country-years of 
warfare.
Source: Banks, Time Series 1815–1973. 
where the United States long condoned the Apartheid government’s occupa-
tion of Namibia, while the Soviets and Cubans backed liberation movements 
there and in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. The result 
was widespread destruction of property and thousands killed. 
  The newly independent Latin American countries did not possess in-
ternationally or even domestically recognized boundaries. Border wars, 
especially in Central America, were provoked by efforts to reunify now-
independent territories. The conflicts were very costly and contributed 
to persistent fiscal crises: between 1822 and 1860, military expenditures 
averaged about 77 percent of total budgets in Latin America.
18 Conflicts 
over borders were less prevalent in Africa.
19 Wars against minority re-
gimes were more common, particularly in Southern Africa. Table 2 
summarizes the evidence on African violence between 1950 and 1973. 
Over that quarter century, violent deaths averaged 2.4 per thousand in 
Africa, or more than six times the OECD.
20 Note that postcolonial Af-
rica was twice as violent as postcolonial Latin America (2.4 versus 1.2 
deaths per thousand). One wonders how much of the difference was due 
to the larger European presence in Latin America and how much to the 
relative inefficiency of nineteenth-century weaponry. 
Lost Decades and Violence 
  In postcolonial Latin America and Africa, high levels of violence, po-
litical instability, economic balkanization, and antitrade policies all 
18 For cases where we have data, government spending in Latin America was from 5 or 10 
percent of GDP. Thus, military expenditures were from 3.8 to 7.7 percent of GDP. 
19 Insofar as they did occur, African border conflicts tended to center in the Horn, where So-
malia sought to unite all Somalis into a single state, or to involve secessionist movements, as in 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Congo. 
20 Banks, Cross-National Time Series.Lost Decades 925 
TABLE3
GDP PER CAPITA LEVELS AND GROWTH: LATIN AMERICA, 1820–1870, 
 AND AFRICA, 1950–1992 
Latin America
1820–1870
Latin America
as Ratio to 
OECD
Africa
1950–1992  
Africa
as Ratio to 
OECD
GDP per capita level  
(in 1990 US dollars)    751    0.44    1,099    0.1 
GDP per capita growth rate    0.07 %    0.07    0.89 %    0.31 
Notes: All regional averages are weighted by population. Latin America = Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Pre-1870 OECD = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United King-
dom. Post–1950 Africa = Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Zaire. Latin America and OECD GDP per capita for 1820–1870 is an average of 1820 and 
1870. Africa and OECD GDP per capita 1950–1992 is an average of all years in the period. 
Sources: Maddison, World Economy; and Coatsworth, “Economic and Institutional Trajecto-
ries.”
sabotaged economic growth and reduced state capacities below the al-
ready low levels that had characterized the colonial regimes.
21
Table 3 summarizes Latin American economic performance between 
1820 and 1870, where it is compared with the European “core” (what we 
call in Table 3 the OECD) and with post-1950 Africa. Latin American 
per capita GDP growth rates were 0.07 percent per annum, or, adjusting 
for the dubious quality of the data, about zero. This during a period when 
per capita GDP was growing at 1 percent per annum in the industrializing 
European core. The postindependence decades were clearly ones of dra-
matic falling behind for Latin America, and the correlation between con-
flict, violence, and instability, on the one hand, and poor growth, on the 
other, was causal.
22 The African per capita GDP growth rate was 0.89 
percent per annum between 1950 and 1992, this during an era when the 
European industrial core grew almost three times as fast. These postinde-
pendence decades were ones of dramatic falling behind for Africa, and it 
appears, once again, that conflict, violence, and political instability were 
the root causes.
23 In short, economic performance in the half-century after 
independence was abysmal in both Latin America and Africa in the post-
imperial era.
24 Lost decades indeed. 
21 Prados de la Escosura and Amaral, La Independencia americana.
22 Ponzio, “Looking at the Dark Side.” 
23 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy”; Collier et al., “Flight Capital”; and Artadi 
and Sala-i-Matin, “Economic Tragedy.” 
24 That GDP per capita growth rates were higher in late-twentieth-century Africa (0.89 per-
cent) than in early-nineteenth-century Latin America (0.07 percent) has, no doubt, many expla-
nations, but one of them must surely be the fact that world productivity growth was much faster 
in the late twentieth century. African countries took advantage of that fact, even though they ab-
sorbed new foreign technologies only imperfectly and incompletely. 926 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
  Paul Collier and his collaborators offer insight into the impact of vio-
lence on private capital in Africa.
25 Conflict affected both the composi-
tion and the quantity of capital. In the face of political instability, uncer-
tainty over property rights, and potential violence, individuals tend to 
hold more mobile forms of capital, liquid rather than fixed investments, 
or land. And when fighting destroys old capital, investment in new capi-
tal also declines. Both the reduction in the demand for local capital and 
the shift from fixed to liquid assets promoted capital flight. One esti-
mate has it that 40 percent of private African wealth had been moved 
offshore by 1980, and that the threat of violent conflict was among the 
most important determinants of capital flight.
26
  Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong and Marva Corley find both a direct 
and a lagged relationship between civil war and economic growth in Af-
rica, the channel of influence running through capital formation.
27 The 
impact was very large relative to average growth rates, something in ex-
cess of 4 percentage points. Collier and his colleagues calculated that 
the longer term effect amounted to a reduction of 2.1 percentage points 
over the five years following a civil war.
28 Although lower than that es-
timated by Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, the Collier estimate is large 
enough to account for a major portion of the lost-decades gap between 
Africa’s GDP per capita growth rate and that of other parts of the world. 
  At the end of the cold war, Africa had about a quarter of the world’s 
nations, about a tenth of the world’s population, and about a twentieth 
of the world’s GDP.
29 Yet, it had about half of the world’s civil wars.
30
Thus, Africa has supplied far more than its share of violent political 
conflict. It is perhaps for this reason that Africa is rated the riskiest con-
tinent for investors.
31 One can only suppose that the same political in-
stability and violence explained the lack of foreign capital in postinde-
pendence Latin America even after 1850 when the late-nineteenth-
century global capital market really started its boom.
32 Although we 
25 Collier et al., “Africa’s Exodus.” 
26 Collier et al., “Africa’s Exodus,” p. 22. 
27 Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, “Civil Wars.” 
28 Collier et al., “Flight Capital.” 
29 On measuring Africa’s share of the world’s nations: The denominator is the number of 
members of the United Nations. The numerator is the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. Accordingly, Sub-Saharan Africa’s percentage of the world’s nations was 25 percent. The 
figure for all Africa was 23 percent. Similarly for measuring population and GDP shares. 
30 A 46 percent figure applies to 1989, and a 53 percent figure to 1991. Both figures are cal-
culated from data gathered by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo on conflicts between insur-
gent groups and governments that generate 1,000 or more battle deaths per annum (Strand et al., 
Armed Conflict Data).
31 Collier et al., “Flight Capital.” 
32 Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets.Lost Decades 927 
TABLE4
MARKET SIZE DURING LOST DECADES 
(percentage of OECD average) 
Latin America 1820    Latin America 1870   
Argentina  5.17  Argentina  9.29
Brazil   25.56  Brazil   28.61
Mexico   42.38  Chile    9.11
Average     24.37  Mexico   25.83
     Average      18.21
Africa 1950    Africa 1992   
Cote d’Ivoire    2.90  Cote d’Ivoire    3.15
Ethiopia   5.55  Ethiopia   3.57
Ghana   5.70  Ghana   3.46
Kenya   4.35  Kenya   5.85
Nigeria   21.61  Nigeria   22.86
South Africa    34.11  South Africa    28.20
Tanzania   3.89  Tanzania   3.41
Zaire   6.91  Zaire   2.90
Average     10.63  Average     9.17
Notes: Market size calculated as GDP. All averages are unweighted of the countries listed. 
Sources: As in Table 3. 
cannot offer any hard estimates of capital flight from postcolonial Latin 
America, it probably happened there, too, although to a lesser extent.
33
Lost Decades, Balkanization, and Antimarket Policy 
  Political, fiscal, currency, and market fragmentation created eco-
nomic balkanization in postindependence Latin America.
34 Balkaniza-
tion probably had a smaller impact in Latin America than in Africa be-
cause intercolonial trade in the Americas was relatively modest, largely 
due to imperial trade monopolies and high transport costs.
35 Unfortu-
nately, postcolonial protectionism diminished any positive impact that 
could have been expected from the removal of Iberian commercial mo-
nopolies. Table 4 gives us some notion as to what was lost by market 
33 Although there are virtually no data to prove it, capital flight from Latin America during its 
lost decades was probably small. First, because Spain raised taxes and imposed forced loans 
mercilessly during the French Wars, the colonies were already stripped of liquid capital before 
the independence wars broke out. Second, most of the remaining capital flight had already taken 
place when the Spaniards left their former colonies before the lost decades. Third, most assets of 
the colonial elite (land and natural resources) could not easily be converted to liquid assets that 
could be exported abroad for safe keeping. 
34 Irigoin, “Macroeconomic Aspects”; Prados de la Escosura, “Economic Consequences”; and  
Grafe and Irigoin, “Spanish Empire.” 
35 Much of that trade was also forced by colonial fiat. For example, the inclusion of Upper 
Peru (Bolivia) within the Viceroyalty of La Plata, created in 1776, forced Bolivian miners to 
send their silver overland to Buenos Aires to be exported and to import products (mules, sugar) 
only from Argentina. 928 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
fragmentation and protection in Latin America. In 1820 the three big-
gest Latin American economies had an average market size (GDP) only 
about one-fifth that of the average European core country (again, called 
OECD in the table). Combined, these three would have formed a fed-
eration about 73 percent of the OECD average size. The young Repub-
lics paid for this fragmentation with small markets, small scale, and cor-
respondingly low productivity. In 1870 the average figure for the four 
biggest Latin American economies was less than a fifth of the average 
European core country, but the four combined would, once again, have 
made a federation 73 percent of the OECD average. If scale economies 
and internal trade matter as much as economists (and historians of the 
United States) think, postcolonial Latin America could have lost a lot 
from this fragmentation and balkanization, especially after railroads be-
came available in the 1830s to conquer the physical barriers to market 
integration.
  Balkanization took place in postindependence Africa as well, and to 
an even greater degree. By 1960 the French colonies had opted for self-
government and dismantled their respective federations.
36 While they 
remained within a currency zone managed by France, each could now 
impose tariffs, regulate trade, and manage transport services with an eye 
to their respective national jurisdictions rather than to international 
markets. The achievement of independence by Zambia and Malawi 
marked the break-up of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. 
The East African High Commission also broke apart, as newly inde-
pendent Uganda and Tanzania each sought to promote the growth of lo-
cal industries, which tended to locate in Kenya. Throughout Africa, 
each newly independent country issued its own currency. Both English- 
and French-speaking countries regulated the flow of labor and capital 
across their boundaries. In addition, governments, especially those in 
southern Africa, adopted policies that fragmented transport networks. 
The effect of balkanization is clear in the data: the average African 
economy had a market size (GDP) only one-tenth that of the average 
OECD country in both 1950 and 1992. To make matters worse, most 
countries opted for import-substituting industrial policies, seeking to 
promote the formation of local manufacturing despite the small size of 
local markets, much as the new Latin American republics did in the 
nineteenth century. 
  International conflict added to the pressures for economic protection 
and the resultant segmentation of markets. Governments waging war 
need revenues, and customs duties were the most convenient source. 
36 Technically, they opted for “autonomy within the French community.” Lost Decades 929 
FIGURE1
AFRICAN POLICY REGIMES OVER TIME 
Note: See the text for definitions. 
Source: Bates, “Chapter 4.”  
  The aggressive antitrade and antimarket policies in Latin American 
meant that the continent failed to benefit from the boom in world trade 
between 1820 and 1870.
37 So too in Africa, where protected economies 
failed to exploit the world trade boom that started after 1950. Like Latin 
American regimes, postcolonial African governments adopted a mix of 
antitrade and antimarket policies, the most notable features of which 
were the movement to a closed economy, the regulation and promotion 
of industry, and the widespread use of price controls.
38 Prevailing eco-
nomic doctrines, political commitments to socialism, and pressures for 
economic redistribution put a political premium on these interventionist 
policies. Indeed, governments adopted such policies in 60 percent of the 
cases by the mid-1970s (Figure 1).
39 Even Africa’s coastal economies, 
which were spared civil war in the postimperial period (Figure 2), were 
37 By 1865, and with the exception of the United States, Latin America had the highest tariffs 
in the world (Coatsworth and Williamson, “Roots”). High postindependence tariffs in Latin 
America can be explained by war revenue needs, redistribution goals, domestic industrial pol-
icy, as well as other forces (Williamson, Globalization, chapter 7, and “Explaining World Tar-
iffs”).
38 Ndulu and O’Connell, Development Deferred.
39 The figure exploits 46 countries, and averages over five year periods. The term “control re-
gime” refers to those African states using the following policies: import barriers, export taxes, 
exchange rate overvaluation, fixed interest rates, price controls, and public ownership. The term 
“syndrome free” refers to those African states avoiding such controls. See Ndulu and 
O’Connell, Development Deferred.
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FIGURE2
CIVIL WARS BY AFRICAN REGION, 1970–1995 
Note: The figures refer to the percentage of total country-years, of which there were 1,196 over 
the period 1970–1995. 
Source: Bates, “Chapter 7.” 
subjected to these antitrade and antimarket policies. This fact may help 
explain their failure to emulate the growth performance of coastal 
economies in other parts of the developing world in the late twentieth 
century, especially those of Asia.
40
Table 5 offers some summary statistics confirming that both regions 
were highly protectionist, antiglobal, and had high tariffs (and export 
taxes). The average Latin American tariff rate in 1870 was about 24 
percent, more than four times that of the European core.
41 Further-
more, Latin America relied heavily on customs duties as a source of 
revenue. The average share of customs duties in total revenues across 
11 Latin American republics was 57.8 percent between 1820 and 
1890.
42 Customs revenues were even more important for federal gov-
ernments (65.6 percent). In the modern era, when nontariff barriers are 
often much more effective in reducing trade, the average African tariff 
rate was still almost 15 percent (1971–1991) vastly higher than for 
free-trade OECD. Postcolonial Africa scored, and postcolonial Latin 
America would have scored, extremely low on the Sachs-Warner 
openness index. In the case of Latin America, these negative antiglobal 
40 Sachs, “Tropical Underdevelopment.” 
41 An average tariff rate of 24 percent may seem modest, but it was consistent with much
higher tariffs on import-competing goods, such as manufactures. 
42 Centeno, “Blood,” table 1. 
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TABLE5
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON TARIFFS AND OPENNESS 
Sachs-Warner Open 
Indicators
Average Tariff
Rate 1870 
(%)
Average Tariff 
Rate 1971–1999
(%)
1963  1992 
(1) Latin American     24.1             
(2) West Europe     5.7             
Ratio (1)/(2)    4.23             
(3) Africa      14.9    0.066    0.177 
(4) European OECD        0.43    1    1 
Ratio  (3)/(4)      34.75         
Ratio  (4)/(3)          15.1    5.6 
Notes: Latin America in 1870 includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. 
Africa in 1971–1999 includes Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania, and Zaire. All regional averages are population weighted. 
Sources: Tariff rates 1971–1999 are from World Development Indicators online. The Sachs-
Warner open index includes five attributes of openness, including tariffs, black market foreign 
exchange rates, and trade as a share of GDP (Sachs et al., ”Economic Reform.”) Latin American 
1870 tariff rates are from data underlying Coatsworth and Williamson, “Roots.” 
factors swamped the positive effects that should have come from the 
dissolution of imperial trade monopolies.
43
The World Economic Environment 
  What about exports per capita, another measure of openness? Table 6 
reports impressive growth rates in Latin America after the lost decades, 
averaging a little more than 2 percent per annum from 1850 to 1912. 
The half century before 1850 is quite a different story: except for Chile, 
the growth rates of exports per capita were below 1 percent per annum, 
and in three cases they were below 0.4 percent per annum. The source 
of low and stable exports was certainly not faltering world demand as 
during its lost decades Latin America shared in the spectacular secular 
terms-of-trade boom that favored all commodity exporting periphery 
regions.
44 True, Figure 3 suggests that Latin America had a less dra-
matic terms-of-trade boom than did the rest of the periphery, but over 
the four decades between 1820 and 1860 the ratio of export to import 
prices in Latin America rose by more than 50 percent.  
  What about postcolonial Africa? Figure 4 presents a terms-of-trade 
series for sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2003. Although the mid-late 
43 Brazil is an exception to the rule. Virtual free trade had been declared by the Portuguese 
king, João IV, on his arrival in the colony in 1808, but the impact was minimal. Regional, sepa-
ratist, and slave revolts wracked the country after independence, generating revenue needs and 
tariffs, although a commercial treaty with Britain kept tariff rates low initially.  
44 Williamson, Globalization, chapter 6. 932 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
TABLE6
LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS PER CAPITA IN US DOLLARS, 1800–1912 
              
Growth Rate 
(percent per year) 
   1800    1850   1912   1800–1850   1850–1912 
Argentina   10.03   10.3   62.1   0.05    2.89 
Brazil   4.78    5    14.2   0.09    1.69 
Chile   1.63    7.8   44.7   3.18   2.86 
Cuba   18.35    22.2   64.7   0.38  1.74 
Mexico   2.11    3.2   10.7   0.84    1.97 
Peru   2.31    3.7   9.4   0.95   1.52 
Sources: For 1850, Coatsworth, “Economic and Institutional Trajectories,” p. 31. For 1800 and 
1912, Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, p. 37. 
1980s were certainly bad years for its commodity prices, Africa had 20 
or even 40 years (if we reach back to 1940) of strong markets for its ex-
ports.
45 Clearly, explanations for Africa’s and Latin America’s lost dec-
ades cannot lie with poor world market conditions. 
Violence and the Drift to Liberalism 
  Postcolonial violence and economic decline in both Africa and Latin 
America reduced state capacities and thus undermined economic strate-
gies that required strong national governments. Yet, Latin America’s 
civil wars and international conflicts also undermined many burden-
some colonial institutions: caste systems, slavery, state monopolies, in-
ternal customs, trade regulations, heavily taxed urban consumption, 
state enforcement of the tithe, and archaic property rights in land (such 
as entail and mortmain).
46 Conservative governments attempted to re-
vive elements of the caste system in Bolivia and Peru, but enforcement 
depended on indigenous collaboration, which soon evaporated. The 
slave systems had been undermined in Hispaniola and in those mainland 
colonies where independence leaders offered freedom to slaves who 
joined them (Bolivar in Venezuela and Columbia, San Martin in Argen-
tina and Chile). Secularizing governments stopped enforcing the tithe. 
Entail (mayorazgo) was abolished when republican governments re-
fused to recognize titles of nobility. Church property was disentailed, 
and when the Church resisted (as in Mexico), its properties were expro- 
45 Deaton, “Commodity Prices.”  
46 Customs houses along roads and at city gates were eliminated. Furthermore, restrictive 
regulations were abandoned, such as the rules mandating seizure of imported goods that devi-
ated from specified routes into the interior and required a document called guias, which had to 
be signed at each destination and returned to the port of entry. The elimination of these institu-
tions was trade-creating, of course. Lost Decades 933 
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FIGURE3
TERMS OF TRADE COMPARISONS ON THE UP-SIDE: THE PERIPHERY, 1820–1860 
(1828 = 100) 
Note: The terms of trade equals the price of exports over that of imports. The Latin America se-
ries is an unweighted country average. 
Source: Williamson, “Globalization, De-Industrialization.” 
priated and sold. The hitherto inalienable lands assigned to indigenous 
villages and town councils (cabildos, ayuntamientos) were sold and ef-
forts were undertaken to privatize public lands through auctions, grants, 
and colonization. Reforms of the property rights system culminated in 
new civil and commercial codes after mid century. Fiscal necessity (to 
finance conflicts) as much as ideology drove much of this activity, 
which was often accompanied by new tariff codes, fiscal reform, and 
the reorganization of judicial systems. 
  The net effect of these institutional changes was to liberate economic 
activity from a burdensome colonial legacy. In that sense, Latin America’s 934 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
FIGURE4
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TERMS OF TRADE, 1960–2003 
(1987 = 10) 
Note: The terms of trade equals the average, across Africa, of the commodity export price in-
dexes divided by the manufacturing export unit value index for industrial countries. 
Source: Cashin et al., “Commodity Currencies.” 
civil wars and international conflicts of the postindependence decades 
had a modernizing impact. They undermined and made unenforceable 
both the state-sanctioned private privileges of the region’s elites and the 
myriad internal taxes, regulations, and monopolies of the colonial re-
gime. Thus, Latin America began drifting toward liberalism long before 
it became an ideology and a slogan. 
  Economic decline also undermined state-centered, antimarket strate-
gies in Africa and set in motion the liberalization of economic policies. 
Governments had overvalued their currencies, undermined export in-
centives, and created incentives for smuggling. Because total public 
revenues relied so heavily on import and export taxes, they declined. In 
addition, governments that had regulated industries and imposed price 
controls created incentives for economic activity to shift to the informal 
economy, where it remained untaxed. This policy induced fiscal crisis 
and contributed to the collapse of political order. Furthermore, because 
governments had retained power by targeting economic benefits to 
powerful constituencies, the decline in public revenues led to a rise in 
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political instability. When governments could not pay their military 
forces—or paid them in worthless currencies—soldiers began to pay 
themselves in kind by engaging in extortion and looting, giving rise to 
even higher levels of economic insecurity. 
  The rising African public debt was held by international financial in-
stitutions, particularly the World Bank, which by the late twentieth cen-
tury had assumed a major portion of the costs of African government. 
The bank increasingly pressured governments to abandon policies that 
sought to override market forces and to adopt policies that harnessed 
market incentives.
47 Attempts to stabilize the political and economic 
fortunes of the state in Africa thus led to liberal policy reform: aban-
donment of public deficits, price controls, and government monopo-
lies.
48 Figure 1 depicts this movement toward liberal, free market re-
forms—what has been labeled “syndrome free” policies elsewhere.
49
Why Were the Lost Decades So Long? 
  Neither the premodern imperialists in Latin America nor the modern 
imperialists in Africa sought to create a social base for economic 
growth in their colonies. Thus, the forces making for a postcolonial 
Latin American liberal drift were successfully resisted by powerful set-
tler elites for decades while proponents of liberal reform remained too 
weak to dislodge them quickly. In the most populous Latin American 
colonies, typified by Mexico and Peru, colonial elites resisted change 
because their class and ethnic interests linked them to the imperial re-
gime. Colonial restrictions on economic activity had impeded the de-
velopment of a business class sufficiently strong to overturn the privi-
leges of the colonial elite. Furthermore, the civil strife that accompanied 
independence impoverished many businessmen who might have been 
inclined toward liberalism. In most large countries, liberals were also 
federalists, which made national governments even weaker.
50 Political 
stalemate and economic stagnation slowed, and at times even temporar-
ily reversed, Latin America’s decades-long drift toward liberalism. 
47 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa. Britain and other lenders and trading partners applied the 
same pressure on nineteenth-century Latin America, urging more conservative market-friendly 
policies consistent with “the London consensus.” 
48 World Bank, Adjustment.
49 Ndulu et al., Political Economy.
50 Argentina offers an exception in that the absence of either an indigenous underclass or 
plantation slavery reduced the postcolonial conflicts to squabbles over the spatial distribution of 
political power, with most liberals supporting a centralist regime dominated by the port city of 
Buenos Aires. 936 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
  The equally glacial drift toward African economic reform reflected 
the power of the same perverse equilibrium in which political actors 
may have understood the costs of antigrowth and antimarket policies 
but could not unilaterally abandon their commitment to them. Policies 
toward agriculture illustrate the point. Urban labor, industry, and the 
governments that represented them, all championed “low price” policies 
for basic foodstuffs. Through retail price controls, monopsony purchas-
ing, and the opening up of domestic markets to foreign imports (which 
could be purchased with overvalued currencies), African governments 
sought to provide urban consumers with cheap food.
51 These policies 
raised real incomes for city workers, and lowered the own-wage of ur-
ban labor, thus supporting industrial profits. But these pro-urban poli-
cies undercut the profitability of agriculture (the largest sector of most 
African economies), and led inevitably to food shortages and dimin-
ished economic growth.  
  Although these policies imposed significant costs on African states, 
they endured for decades. No labor leader could afford to demand their 
reversal. And no political leader could champion policies that would, 
initially at least, raise the cost of living for urban consumers. As a re-
sult, the antigrowth policies remained in place throughout the lost dec-
ades. Eventually, they undermined the legitimacy of governments. 
REFORM AND RECOVERY 
  Nearly everything changed in Latin America after the 1860s. First, 
there came political (and often military) victory of Liberal political 
forces that eliminated ethnic discrimination by the state, abolished slav-
ery, separated church and state, put an end to archaic property rights in 
land, privatized public assets (especially land), abolished internal cus-
toms, and eliminated public monopolies. Second, long-term stability 
was secured in most cases by means of historic compromises among 
competing economic interests. Once conservatives accepted the new 
rules of the game, militarism and popular mobilization were replaced by 
governing arrangements that provided major domestic and foreign busi-
ness groups secure access to influence. Third, the new political econ-
omy came to be embodied in modern civil and commercial codes, judi-
cial reform and reorganization, new banking and insurance laws, 
renegotiation of domestic and external debts, tariff protection for indus-
tries in the larger economies, increasing public investment in physical 
infrastructure and security. Fourth, stability facilitated economic 
51 Bates, Markets.Lost Decades 937 
growth, which helped to cement the new political economy.
52 The GDP 
per capita growth rate was 1.8 percent per annum for Latin America be-
tween 1870 and 1913.
53 Economic growth was sustained by new in-
vestment, particularly foreign investment, which came first in response 
to government guarantees and subsidies (railroads, public works, bank-
ing), and then to exploit new opportunities in export production and in-
dustry.
54
  These changes could not have been achieved in most Latin American 
countries without the conflict and bloodshed of the lost decades. Civil 
wars destroyed many of the colonial institutions that Liberals sought to 
abolish long before the fighting stopped. This destructive phase of insti-
tutional modernization facilitated the transition to a second more con-
structive phase in which governments discovered—often through trial 
and error over two or three decades—the institutional arrangements and 
policies most likely to encourage investment and growth. The new re-
gimes succeeded in eliminating (or at least diminishing) the political 
participation of the rural poor. They centralized power in provincial and 
national capitals, away from villages and small towns. They also in-
stalled, or enforced more rigorously, property and literacy limits on the 
franchise. Political exclusion aided political stability and economic 
growth, but favored a less egalitarian society and government policies 
that maximized short-run returns on social overhead capital, and fos-
tered the import of foreign investment, technology, and skills.
55 Still, 
most stable Latin American regimes of the late nineteenth century 
lacked the capacity or the incentives to create institutions that could 
credibly guarantee the property and civic rights of ordinary citizens or 
give priority to investments in human capital. Thus, institutions favor-
ing inclusive development did not develop in Latin America after the 
lost decades were over. 
  In recent years, Africa has also experienced a decline in political con-
flict. While it continues on the Horn of Africa, the liberation wars in 
Southern Africa have come to an end, as have the civil wars in post- 
52 Ponzio, “Looking at the Dark Side.” 
53 Maddison, World Economy, p. 142. 
54 Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets.
55 Economic modernization provoked widespread increases in the concentration of land own-
ership (Coatsworth, “Railroads”), wages rose more slowly than did per capita GDP (William-
son, “Real Wages”), and inequality rose overall (Prados de la Escosura, “Growth”). Those Latin 
American economies that achieved long term GDP per capita growth rates comparable to the 
United States achieved it at the cost of greater inequality and chronic social and political ten-
sion. The reader has, no doubt, noted that we have written this article so far without reference to 
the important work of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (“Factor Endowments”). 
Engerman and Sokoloff focus on Latin America in the very long run, whereas we focus on its 
distinctly different economic and political performance before and after 1870. 938 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
FIGURE5
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA, 1970–1995 
Notes: No party: head of state organizes government, political parties outlawed. Single party: 
head of state chosen by governing party, opposition parties banned. Competitive: head of state 
chosen in an open election against rivals from competing parties. 
Source: Bates, “Chapter 10.” 
colonial Mozambique and Angola. Whereas Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe are still torn by civil war, 14 others have dropped 
from that list, and, most recently, perhaps even Cote d’Ivoire.
56 In 
many—especially Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Burundi, and Nigeria—peace 
remains fragile, but at least military conflict had stopped when this was 
written.
  Unlike Latin America, where newly stable regimes worked to ex-
clude majorities by restricting the franchise, Figure 5 shows that in Af-
rica no-party (largely military) and single-party systems gave way to 
competitive party systems with universal adult suffrage during the pe-
riod of democratic reforms in the 1990s. Policy reform followed politi-
cal reform in Africa, with the abandonment of regimes that controlled 
the economy in favor of ones that regulated the economy less, produced 
fewer price distortions, and relied more heavily on market incentives.
57
That African political reform and policy reform should go together 
56 Angola, Benin, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Congo. 
57 See Figure 1; and Ndulu et al., Political Economy.
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TABLE7
REAL GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES, 2000–2005 
(percent per year) 
 Region    Growth  Rate  
Europe and Central Asia    5.41   
European Monetary Union    1.34   
East Asia and Pacific    7.17   
Latin America and Caribbean   1.21   
Middle East and North Africa   2.01   
 South  Asia    4.24   
 Sub-Saharan  Africa    1.76   
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006.
should not be surprising. Small holder farms faced high costs of organi-
zation, and so were ineffective lobbyists; but, being numerous, they 
constituted a large voting bloc. With the reintroduction of competitive 
party politics, that large voting bloc got voice, and leaders now had in-
centives to abandon the antigrowth policies that had imposed such 
heavy burdens on small holder agriculture for so long. 
  Just like Latin America in its late-nineteenth-century belle époque,
modern Africa has also experienced a rise in the demand for its exports. 
Fueled by fast economic growth in Asia—China and India in particular, 
Africa now benefits from a growing demand for timber, oil, metals, and 
other primary products.
58 This and liberal reforms have yielded the first 
spell of positive rates of economic growth since the first decade of in-
dependence, more than 40 years ago (Table 7). 
HISTORICAL LESSONS FOR AFRICA’S FUTURE 
  The comparison we have offered suggests cautious optimism for Af-
rica’s future. One the one hand, Latin America finally emerged from its 
postindependence lost decades into a second half-century of impressive 
growth and political stability, and there are signs that Africa may emu-
late this experience. On the other hand, the social costs of the policies 
that led to this Latin American outcome were high, generating benefits 
for the few, more economic inequality, and political exclusion. If his-
tory repeats itself, Africa too can grow, but the danger is that the 
achievement of economic growth and political stability may come at the 
same high social cost. 
58 It also benefits from a demand for simple labor-intensive manufactures. Sub-Saharan Af-
rica is shifting out of mineral and agricultural exports and in to manufactures, although it only 
became apparent in the early 1990s. The share of manufactures in total exports in this region 
was only 12 or 13 percent in 1991, whereas it was almost 50 percent in 1998 (Martin, “Chang-
ing Participation”; and Williamson, “Globalization, De-Industrialization,” figure 6). 940 Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 
The 1990s were marked by the rise of democracy and the overthrow 
of authoritarian regimes in Africa. Instead of single-party politics or 
military rule, multiparty politics prevailed in nearly 70 percent of the 
region by 1995. In addition, African governments increasingly adopted 
more liberal economic policies. The fall of communism, external pres-
sures for policy reform, and the simple fact that governments wishing 
to remain in power had to compete for votes meant that they could no 
longer impose the policies they once had favored. Thus, an economic 
benefit accompanied the end of political conflict because much of Af-
rica began to adopt more market-oriented and progrowth policies 
when expanding world markets were reinforcing Africa’s improved 
economic performance. The rising demand for primary products from 
Asia’s growing economies has helped spark a resumption of growth in 
twenty-first-century Africa just as an accelerating world industrial 
revolution helped create the belle époque for late-nineteenth-century 
Latin America. 
  But will Africa pay the same price for modern economic growth as 
did Latin America? Will the growth of exports, the abandonment of 
monopolies, and the promotion of markets also be accompanied by the 
rise of inequality and the consolidation of power by an oligarchic elite? 
There are signs of such a trend: the privatization of public assets in Af-
rica has already led to their accumulation by the political elite. How-
ever, Africa is departing from Latin American history in two fundamen-
tal ways. First, there are no restrictions on the franchise in the emerging 
African democracies, whereas there certainly were such restrictions in 
most of late-nineteenth-century Latin America.
59 Second, recall that Af-
rica’s population is composed of a far larger share of indigenous people 
and a far smaller share of European settlers (and their descendants) than 
was true of Latin America 150 years ago. As a result of the vastly 
greater political weight of the indigenous population, the reform of pri-
vate property rights to land, which could lead to concentration and ine-
quality, remains off the political agenda in most of Africa, whereas it 
was central to the political agenda of the liberal regimes in late-
nineteenth-century Latin America. Perhaps Africa will not have to pay 
the same social inequality price for modern economic growth that Latin 
America did following its lost decades. 
59 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments.” Lost Decades 941 
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